Collusion between Russia and North Korea has never been in China’s interest. In this crisis, there is much more at stake for Beijing’s direct security interests, as well as those of the United States and its closest Asian allies.
The newly signed security pact between Russia and North Korea has raised anxiety around the world about the growing alliance between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and its implications for the Korean Peninsula, Ukraine and the rest of the world. While some have pointed to the developments as further evidence of the “evil alignment“Between Russia, North Korea, China and Iran, the reality is that the pact could do more to fracture than solidify this burgeoning axis.
With regional tensions rising, history could repeat itself: China could be dragged into a crisis or even an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula that it has no interest in waging, and forced to clean up the mess itself given Moscow’s degree of focus on Europe and suffer major setbacks to its priorities.
China’s main objectives on the Korean Peninsula – neither crisis nor chaos – are more in line with the interests of Washington and its allies than with those of Pyongyang and Moscow. Before a crisis erupts, the United States and China, along with South Korea and other regional stakeholders, should work together to curb Putin-Kim collaboration and renew diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea emboldened
The security pact signed between Russia and North Korea is deliberately ambiguous. text The treaty states that both sides will provide “military and other assistance with all means at their disposal without delay” if one of the parties falls into a “state of war” due to an “armed invasion” by one or more countries. This raises the question of what is meant by a “state of war” and what threshold must be reached for the mutual security clause to be triggered. Furthermore, the type of support to be provided by each party is left unspecified: “military and other assistance” could refer to anything from intelligence sharing to sending troops on the ground.
This ambiguity is likely intended to convey uncertainty in the United States and its allies about what the mutual defense clause might trigger and, consequently, to instill caution. Moreover, the vague wording on the types of assistance gives Pyongyang and Moscow a degree of flexibility in their obligations. It is also worth saying that it is quite possible that Moscow and Pyongyang have different interpretations and expectations of what they have promised each other.
There are serious concerns, however, that with a Russian “security guarantee” or at least the appearance of one, North Korea may feel encouraged to step up its provocations, based on the belief that the United States and its allies will respond more cautiously now that they have to take into account a possible Russian reaction.
Putin is unlikely to stop Kim
Even more worrying is that Moscow has little incentive to restrain its junior partner from actions that would destabilise Northeast Asia. Indeed, Putin might well welcome any North Korean provocation on the Korean Peninsula that forces the US to turn its attention away from Europe, where Russia is pursuing its relentless war against Ukraine.
It is also conceivable that Russia and North Korea – both of which have much to gain from another Trump presidency – could initiate a “October surprise“in an attempt to tilt the US presidential election in Trump’s favour. After all, the former president has voiced openly your affection by both Kim and Putin. Trump has also suggested that would reach an agreement with Pyongyang to allow it to keep its nuclear weapons and to would cut aid American to Ukraine immediately after the election.
Divergence of interests between China, Russia and North Korea
These developments have shaken not only the United States and its allies, but also China. Beijing is rapidly losing its influence over Pyongyang to Moscow, while paying the diplomatic costs of its association with the two rogue states.
To be sure, Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang share deep resentments about what they see as a U.S.-dominated world order. All three seek to erode Washington’s power and influence. But a key difference between Beijing and its two partners is that it aims to achieve that end without setting the world on fire or completely derailing its profitable trade ties with other developed countries.
China needs a stable geopolitical environment to deal with its internal economic challenges, to manage trade tensions and to counter the “risk reduction” efforts of Western states. China wants to rise in the technological and innovation scale and accelerate its military modernization, which Beijing considers essential for unification with Taiwan. In contrast, neither Russia nor North Korea have promising economic prospects nor believe they can lead or benefit from a stable world order. That is why both countries have opted exclusively for the violent disruption of the status quo.
In private conversations, Chinese observers, like their South Korean and American counterparts, express concern about the lack of transparency surrounding military technology transfers between Russia and North Korea and their short- and long-term consequences. They also share fears that Putin may be encouraging Kim to take destabilizing actions to distract the United States, raising the risk of war on China’s doorstep.
The last thing Beijing wants is for U.S. attention to shift from Europe to Asia. Beijing is already uncomfortable and angered by the nuclear coordination between the United States and the Republic of Korea, the intensification of trilateral cooperation between the United States, South Korea and Japan, and the many other steps the Biden administration has taken to strengthen deterrence in the region.
China, carrying the burden??
China may soon find itself paying the costs of North Korean adventurism as it did at the beginning of the Cold War, when the newly created People’s Republic of China (PRC), encouraged by Moscow to advance the communist cause in Asia, agreed to support the neighbouring North Korean regime. Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, took advantage of Soviet and Chinese backing to pursue his ambitions to absorb the entire Korean peninsula. He initiated the first hot conflict of the Cold War, which resulted in the deaths of some five million civilians and soldiers, including hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops.
This was happening at a time when the Chinese were faced with the urgent task of consolidating their hold on the country and rebuilding its war-ravaged economy. Instead, they were forced to turn their attention to the Korean peninsula and allocate almost the half of its state budget on military expenditure. Mao Zedong also missed the opportunity to invade Taiwan – a target that still eludes Beijing today – after the United States sent the Seventh Fleet to neutralise the Taiwan Strait.
To make matters worse, the Chinese were counting on Soviet air cover and weapons as part of their agreement with Moscow to help the North Koreans. But Josef Stalin wavered on his commitments at critical moments and the burden of helping the North Koreans fell on Beijing’s shoulders.
Although the PRC of then is not the same as it is today, and the power dynamics between states in the region have changed, collusion between Russia and North Korea has never worked to China’s advantage.
US-China coordination
The United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and virtually all other states in the region seek stability, peace, and the ultimate elimination of the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. There is a compelling case for working together before the Russian-North Korean alliance pushes the region even further away from these goals.
The world is facing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. The fact that Washington and Beijing have not been able to work together and often find themselves in opposing positions raises the question of how cooperation between the United States and China can be expected on the Korean peninsula.
The looming crisis in Northeast Asia, however, is different: the stakes are much higher for China’s direct security interests, as well as those of the United States and its closest Asian allies. Perhaps most disturbingly for Beijing, while it can control the escalatory dynamics in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea as a direct party to conflicts, it cannot say the same for Russia-backed North Korean adventurism.
Strengthening military deterrence between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul is necessary but insufficient to meet the growing challenge posed by the alignment between Russia and North Korea. Clear and credible threats and assurances from China will also be necessary to shape the behavior of Pyongyang and Moscow. Collaboration does not suggest that all steps, if any, should be taken jointly. After all, Washington and Beijing have different relationships and points of influence on North Korea and Russia. But discreet discussions are urgently needed on how both sides could draw red lines and renew a dead diplomatic process that neutralizes the threat posed by North Korea.
Article translated from English from the website of Brookings.
Activity subsidized by the Secretariat of Foreign and Global Affairs.
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