The increasingly difficult consensus on foreign policy

It is increasingly evident that outside, in Europe, in other relationships or globally, internal policies and values ​​are at stake, not just external ones. It was already seen during the pandemic (which has not been addressed since austerity and led to a first European mutualization of debt), the war in Ukraine and its repercussions, relations with Morocco, or now the war in Gaza and the recognition of the State Palestinian. Furthermore, in Spain, internal tension translates into external discrepancies, when the capacity for dialogue between the two great political forces has been lost. Dialogue and consensus between two that are no longer enough in this complex Spain, with more parties and multiple identities. In any case, a strong foreign policy must rely on public opinion, not follow it, but lead it.

A superpower like the United States can allow itself to fluctuate in foreign policy, although the other superpower, China, is more stable in this regard. A medium power like Spain would gain in its ability to punch above its weight, as it has done in some eras, with greater consensus on foreign policy or action, understood in a broad sense. Despite having some permanent challenges, sometimes not shared with other partner and allied countries, the pragmatism of Lord Palmerston does not seem to apply to Spain when he stated that the English “do not have eternal allies, and we do not have perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and our duty is to watch over them.” Of course, Palmerston’s vision no longer applies to a United Kingdom that committed Brexit and is now looking for a new place in the world. Nor, in fact, to any European country, since none of them is anymore sufficient on its own to defend its interests and values. It needs to act in coalition, or give up, especially against its American ally and competitor, and also against its Chinese partner and competitor.

In reality, although there are many areas in which it is maintained, such Spanish consensus on foreign matters is very much a myth. On some issues, such as military aid to Ukraine, it does not even occur within the current government coalition. When the Transition began, there was a political and social consensus: the different governments and society wanted to integrate into the European Communities, a train that had been lost with the Franco dictatorship, and be like “the Europeans”: democracy and the rule of law. , Welfare state, modernization, help to end ETA terrorism, etc. Even so, President Suárez toyed with a certain approach to the world of the non-aligned. Then came, with Calvo Sotelo, entry into NATO, against the formal criteria of the PSOE. Followed by the referendum called by the Government of Felipe González to remain, a consultation in which the most Atlanticist party, Popular, then still Alianza Popular, recommended abstention to its voters. It cost its leader, Manuel Fraga, his job because several allied leaders, starting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, considered him irresponsible.

Europe, today’s EU, has been the object of Spanish consensus, although with its ifs and buts. It is worth remembering that from the opposition (fortunately it would change once in the Government) José María Aznar stated that “his pulse would not tremble” for not entering the euro, or accused the Socialist Executive of being “petiguente” when he was negotiating the Cohesion Fund , as now against the low-interest loan part of the NextGeneration fund. But the biggest bankruptcy came with Aznar’s support for the US invasion of Iraq, rejected by a very majority of public opinion.

Now we are in another world. In a more multipolar and less multilateral, globalized world. What is outside powerfully influences what is inside. With globalization (which is being transformed), with new wars, and with a European Union that, unlike the 80s and 90s of the last century, is our essential framework, our armor (in the good and bad sense ), but he doesn’t really know where he’s going. Within it, and within each Member State, there are conflicting visions. Today more and more policies and values ​​are defended abroad, whether in the EU – hence the importance of these elections to the European Parliament –, in NATO, in bilateral relations, including Latin America, which at times has seemed to have ceased to interest politics, not businessmen, in Spain. And in all kinds of things. Until the Rule of Law, with the unusual supervision or testimony of a European commissioner of the negotiations between PSOE and PP on the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ).

Spain is not alone in these internal divisions on European policy – ​​which is a special category – and foreign policy. It occurs in all countries, when Europe has to make big decisions on very important issues that affect what remains of national sovereignty, such as immigration, defense, the market or the environment, among others. Without forgetting what the concerned European citizens, including the Spanish, according to the Eurobarometer, give more importance: poverty, health and economy. In addition to relations with the United States – a Trump victory could further break Europe or, on the contrary, energize it – and with China.

Although the control of the BOE and the autonomous Official Gazettes in a decentralized country like Spain is very important, the real power for European countries that share sovereignty – to what extent? That’s the thing – it’s played on a much broader board than the national one. The debt, the deficit, the pensions are supervised in Brussels, which demands internal reforms from the Member States. Many other things too. Spain’s membership in the EU and the Eurozone and the attitude of many partners were important factors in stopping the processes. With the paradox that, in Brussels, given the geographical and political diversity, it is necessary to know how to negotiate between different political currents. And when that consensus does not exist, there is no, for example, European foreign policy. See the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

In this sense, Europe should have been a school for Spain, which would have contributed to improving its image and weight. But Europe may no longer be an example given the new polarizations within its societies and between its Member States. Spanish society has lost in Europeanism: the perception of the EU has worsened – only 40% of Spaniards have a positive image and 43% neutral – and the assessment of the institutions has dropped (32% in the case of the European Parliament ). Today this country is among the most skeptical, when traditionally Spanish citizens have been among the most pro-European.

Although it is positive that interest in foreign policy has finally grown.

Activity subsidized by the Ministry of Foreign and Global Affairs.