Iran: the death of a president

On May 19, a helicopter carrying Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi crashed in the northwestern province of East Azerbaijan. Raisi, 63, died along with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian and six others, including the governor of East Azerbaijan and the Friday prayer leader of Tabriz. They were returning from a trip to the border between Iran and Azerbaijan, where they had inaugurated a dam together with the Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev. Bad weather may have been a factor in the incident; It also hampered search and rescue efforts in the remote area where the plane went down. It is not surprising that rumors of foul play have spread. But so far, Tehran has not singled out any of its regional or extra-regional adversaries or fueled speculation.

The implications for domestic politics

Raisi is the first Iranian president to die in office since 1981, when Mohammad-Ali Rajai was killed in a bomb attack less than a month after taking office. A subsequent election elevated Ali Khamenei, current Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, to the presidency. According to Article 131 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, in the event of death or incapacity, the vice president of the president – ​​in this case, Vice President Mohammad Mokhber – must serve in an acting capacity for a maximum of 50 days, a period during which which presidential elections must be organized in collaboration with the president of Parliament and the president of the judiciary. On May 20, the government set June 28 as election day, which would be preceded by the registration of candidates, examination of contenders by the Guardian Council (an unelected supervisory body), and a campaign period.

Raisi assumed office in 2021 and was expected to run for re-election in 2025. The three elections National elections that have been held in the last four years – two parliamentary and one presidential – offer clues about the likely political ramifications of his death, although it is impossible to make concrete predictions.

Firstly, a feature that has stood out in all these recent elections has been the limitation of the political competition to the conservative camp, with contests composed almost exclusively of groups considered unconditional faithful to the central ideology of the Islamic Republic. Oversight bodies have become more likely to annul the candidacies of those considered reformists or moderates in the Islamic Republic’s political spectrum, while security forces have restricted the political activities of these figures. Even some conservatives most critical of the government’s direction have ended up excluded from an electoral system that only tolerates the most loyal. As a result, hardliners have consolidated power in all elected and appointed institutions. There is little indication that they are willing to jeopardize this control by allowing truly competitive elections, especially given that the Supreme Leader constantly urges doctrinal purity.

Secondly, these exclusionary measures have not prevented internal fratricidal struggles on the conservative side, which manifest themselves in the form of blame games over the country’s economic and other problems. Some of the disagreements are ideological, but many are based on power struggles between factions. Khamenei has rebuked the conservatives for their disputes, but the fissures could deepen and accentuate with the unexpected void at the top of the government after Raisi’s death.

“The fissures could deepen and accentuate with the unexpected vacuum at the top of the government”

Third, at the same time that the electoral process has become an increasingly empty exercise, participation has plummeted, and the majority of voters did not participate in the 2020 and 2024 legislative elections, nor in the presidential elections. which Raisi won in 2021. These displays of public disaffection, along with recent and still raw memories of the 2022 national protests, violently repressed, highlight the growing gap between state and society amidst suffocating social and political restrictions, as well as persistent economic unrest. Although the government is likely to try to exploit Raisi’s death to call for national unity, public interest or participation in the election to replace him could be negligible, as many Iranians see no possibility of meaningful change through the polls.

Raisi’s legacy for Iran’s foreign relations

Raisi’s authority in foreign policy matters was limited by competition between the state’s power centers and the decision-making authority of the Supreme Leader, which restricted his influence, but did not spare him a tense period in high office. The main legacy of his rule was a sharp deterioration in Iran’s relations with the West, due to failed efforts to negotiate a return to the 2015 nuclear deal and Tehran’s increasingly close military ties with Moscow during Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the Middle East, the balance is mixed, with improving relations with Arab neighbors in the Gulf, but increasing rivalry with Israel and its allies. The latter was evident in mid-April, when Iran carried out a brazen drone and missile attack against Israel, accompanied by israeli attacks against senior Iranian commanders in Syria and near sensitive nuclear facilities on Iranian soil. The other legacy is economic deterioration.

Despite moves to find relief through greater reliance on domestic capabilities, as well as warmer relations with China and membership in multilateral organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and an expanded BRICS, the country’s economic difficulties have continued. These have taken the form of high inflation and a weakened currency; The recurring cases of corruption suggest considerable rot at the core of the system. The government has long claimed that a “resistance economy” can thrive despite growing Western sanctions imposed on Iran over its nuclear program, regional politics and domestic repression, but persistent economic problems show this strategy has limits. .

“The main legacy of Raisi’s truncated mandate was a sharp deterioration in Iran’s relations with the West”

As for Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian, his personal diplomatic achievements were few. Both the nuclear negotiations and indirect talks in Oman with senior American officials were led by his deputy, Ali Bagheri Kani, now acting foreign minister and seen by many as his most likely successor. Engagement with Middle East neighbors – including the talks that led to the reinstatement of relations with Saudi Arabia with Chinese mediation – was driven mainly by security officials.

It is not immediately clear that these two deaths will have major consequences for Iran’s foreign relations, and uncertainty is likely to persist at least until their replacements are known. Even then, the new president and the new foreign minister are likely to face the same structural limitations in their ability to shape divergent policies. Indeed, over the next few weeks, Iran will remain focused on its internal affairs as it elects its ninth president (as well as confirming a speaker of parliament and a president of the Assembly of Experts, more on which later).

Still, regional tensions remain high, as does the possibility of an external crisis that could drag down Tehran. Low-level hostilities continue between Iran and its “Axis of Resistance” partners, on the one hand, and the United States, Israel and their allies, on the other. As April’s dangerous tug-of-war with Israel highlighted, events always have the potential to escalate, although neither side seems to want that to happen just yet. Raisi and Amir-Abdollahian’s successors are likely to continue efforts to restore ties with Arab neighbors in the Gulf, while on the nuclear front a flashpoint is already in sight, with the next meeting of the Agency’s Board of Governors International Atomic Energy Agency will once again put Tehran’s continued evasions on access and transparency on the table.

What does Raisi’s death mean for the Supreme Leader’s succession?

The Islamic Republic’s absolute priority in recent years has been to leave nothing to chance in preparing for the eventual demise of its most important figure, 85-year-old Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Raisi’s rise to the presidency and his long relationship with Khamenei had made him one of the most likely candidates to succeed the Supreme Leader, becoming the third occupant of the most powerful position in the system since the 1979 revolution. Considered true believers in the Islamic Republic and to exclude those with even modest dissenting opinions, Iranian leaders have sought to consolidate conformity at the top in anticipation of a smooth changing of the guard.

Raisi’s death comes at a time when the Assembly of Experts, the 88-member institution nominally charged with electing the Supreme Leader, is undergoing a delicate transition following the Parliamentary election of March. These involved the disqualification of regime veterans such as Hassan Rouhani, Raisi’s predecessor as president, as well as the electoral defeat of Mohammad Sadegh Amoli-Larijani, another former member of the regime and former head of the judiciary. In Iran’s opaque political environment, no one except a handful of senior officials knew the chances of Raisi becoming the next Supreme Leader. But if he was going to get the job, his death puts a big question mark over the succession.

Article translated from English from the website International Crisis Group.

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