why the stress does not fall only on the Ukrainian side

To the fall of Vuhledar on October 2, we must add that of Selidove in recent days. Both locations have a high symbolic and strategic value. The first had become the quintessential example of Ukrainian resistance during these two and a half years of war, the place where the suicidal offensives of the Russians constantly failed, as they lost thousands of men trying to cross plains without any protection. The second is key to the protection of Pokrovsk and has barely been able to defend itself. The Ukrainian troops have preferred to leave the city to avoid being bagged.

Pushed north and west, Ukrainian troops currently have only four major population centers in Donetsk in their possession: the aforementioned Pokrovsk, communications hub for the entire region, Velyka Novosilka, almost on the border with Zaporizhia, and the important cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, where Ukraine has its command center and where railways still arrive from the west with supplies and replacement troops. Losing Pokrovsk, at risk since last summer, but still some distance from the front, would be a very hard blow that Ukraine must avoid at all costs.

600,000 Russian casualties in two and a half years

That said, Russian advances have not come for nothing. Aware of the importance of these months – winter is approaching, the international community is increasingly tired and the elections in the United States can definitively mark the conflict if it wins donald trump-, the Kremlin has given the order to give absolutely everything, even incorporating ten thousand North Korean soldiers to help liberate the Kursk region.

This has had its consequences: October has also been the month with the highest number of daily casualties and lost tanks. In total, There will be around 1,000 armored vehicles eliminated in a single month, an unsustainable pace. Regarding human losses, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense estimates them at 1,680 per day. Of course, we are not talking about the most reliable source in the world, but that same source gave half as much just a year ago. In other words, Russia is advancing on all fronts, yes, but by launching a meat-grinding machine that will not be able to sustain itself over time if Putin does not want to have serious internal problems with more mass mobilizations.

The diary The Economistciting US military intelligence sources, estimates that 600,000 Russian soldiers have been killed and wounded in Ukraine since the beginning of the invasion, with a total of 57,000 deaths so far in 2024 alone. These are figures that are quite close to those offered by the Ukrainian government, despite the continuous disagreements between both administrations on everything else: how to conduct the war, where to use weapons or what tactical decisions are correct. Recently, the White House leaked to New York Times classified information – specifically, the order for Tomahawk missiles by Volodymyr Zelensky-, which caused deep indignation in kyiv.

This number of victims will continue over the coming months. Although it has already become clear that Russia has made progress in almost all directions, there are places like Chasiv Yar or Toretsk, in the vicinity of Bakhmut, that resist it and in whose assault many lives will have to be lost. Despite the setbacks, retreats, fatigue and the obvious inferiority in numbers of soldiers and ammunition, the Ukrainian defensive line is not broken. It must be remembered that the conflict has already lasted approximately as long as the Spanish civil war and Russia has not yet finished conquering even the two neighboring regions that it had already had under partial control since 2014.

Una inflación disparada

Los problemas de Putin no acaban en lo militar. Según el propio The Economist, Rusia gastará el año que viene un tercio de su presupuesto en defensa, lo que tal vez provoque un crecimiento del PIB en términos totales, pero estrangulará aún más a una sociedad civil cada vez más empobrecida. Cada mes, Moscú recluta 30.000 nuevos jóvenes -y no tan jóvenes, siguen las ofertas especiales para presidiarios y otros colectivos similares-, lo que sirve para suplir las bajas en el frente, pero a la vez disminuye la mano de obra disponible dentro del país y supone un golpe moral enorme para muchísimas familias, sobre todo en las provincias más orientales.

La inflación sigue disparada, rozando el 10% de media mensual, lo que ha provocado que el Banco Central ruso haya subido los tipos de interés hasta el 21%, imposibilitando en la práctica el acceso a financiación para nuevos proyectos que no tengan que ver con la industria militar, algo que recuerda a los peores errores de la época soviética. La moneda, por su parte, sigue depreciándose: para conseguir un dólar hay que pagar 97 rublos. Hace un mes, bastaba con 92,59 y antes de la guerra el cambio estaba a 77. Eso permite aumentar las exportaciones, pero con una economía concentrada en el uso doméstico y tras la pérdida de tantísimos socios, no parece un gran consuelo.

La cuestión ahora mismo, más allá de la presión que se pueda ejercer desde EEUU, está en quién va a quebrarse primero. Las necesidades y las angustias son similares en ambos bandos, solo que las de un lado se publicitan mucho más. Es lo que tiene la prensa libre. Desde medios estadounidenses se especuló recientemente con que Zelenski estaría preparando a su pueblo para un acuerdo con Moscú cediendo territorio a cambio de paz y culpando de ello a Occidente por su falta de compromiso. Tendría sentido, pero lo cierto es que los medios estadounidenses llevan años menospreciando la capacidad ucraniana de resistencia.

Lo importante para Zelenski ahora mismo es abandonar este término medio: o se arma a su país lo suficiente como para que pueda plantar cara a Rusia e incluso ganar la guerra -Vietnam del Norte ganó al ejército estadounidense, los talibanes hicieron lo propio con el soviético- o se le dan las garantías de seguridad suficientes para que cualquier acuerdo se respete en el futuro. Obligar a Ucrania a rendir su territorio a cambio de una promesa vaga de Moscú y sin el compromiso de sus socios occidentales es un disparate. En cinco años, Rusia volverá a la carga y exigirá Járkov y Odesa. Como poco.