What if the problems of the Russian counterattack prove Ukraine right?

From the moment it became known that thousands of Ukrainian soldiers had entered the Russian province of Kursk a month and a half ago, it was clear to everyone that this was, above all, a diversionary maneuver to force Russia to send men to that area and remove them from the front line of Donbas. The maneuver was both a success and a minor failure. The success had to do with the ease with which Ukraine came to have its foothold. its control 1,500 kilometers squares of Russian territory, something not seen since the days of World War II.

The small failure was linked to the low effectiveness of the strategy. Yes, Russia sent men to defend itself and prevent the enemy’s incursion from going even further, but they were mostly newly discharged without experience and units that had little to do in the fight. North of Kharkiv and South of Zaporizhia. Few troops were diverted from the Donetsk front, and certainly very few elite ones. Not only that, but the invasion coincided with two particularly tough months (August and September) for Ukraine, in which Russia managed to advance more ground than in any of the previous twelve.

Now, there was a catch. Russia could afford not to divert troops because it did not intend to retake Kursk. It is not clear whether the Ukrainians were aware of the very little interest that Russia would put into it. in maintaining its territorial integrityThe Kremlin did not even bother to announce a nuclear holocaust, it simply treated the issue with the utmost disdain, as if the neighbour’s children had sneaked into the backyard to play football. Let them, they will get tired of it.

All that, however, changed when Russia announced a counterattack, and did so with the same arrogance as always: setting a deadline (October 1) and assuming that they would meet it with flying colors. Putin thought that by adding more men, even if they did not have the necessary training or experience, he would be able to drive the Ukrainians out in a few days. This is not happening. The obvious progress of the first two days has been followed by a slowdown that may end up proving Syrskyi right. when he set out on his August adventure.

The dangerous border of the Seym River

It is true that Russia managed to drive the Ukrainians out of the vicinity of Korenevo and advanced southeast of the Seym River towards Sudzha, the capital of “Ukrainian Kursk”. However, that advance seems to have stopped and the troops (some 38,000, according to Forbes magazine) risk being trapped in no man’s land, trapped between the territory previously controlled by Ukraine, the border with the neighbouring country, the river itself… and the troops that Syrskyi is sending from the west, crossing the border again at Novyi Put and moving towards Glushkovo.

Putting those 38,000 soldiers out of action with the mere 10,000 that Ukraine has dedicated to the entire operation in Kursk would be a solid move, but it is probably not necessary to ask for so much to gain an advantage in the overall conflict. Now that the counterattack has stalled, Putin must decide whether to bite the bait once and for all. In other words, whether to continue to rely on his second-rate soldiers or whether to take the reconquest seriously and finally send his best men to sort out the mess.

In the first case, the embarrassment would be significant. It is not just that Ukraine is occupying Russian soil, but that Russia, after having made a great deal of publicity about the counteroffensive, has been unable to recover what it has lost. It is not clear that the proud Kremlin will accept such a situation. In the second case, it must be remembered that defending is one thing, attacking is quite another. One cannot abandon the enemy. dominate 1,500 square kilometers and hope to take them off without any problem. The Ukrainian army in Kursk is not very large, but it is well prepared and, after more than a month, it is understandable that it will have built up reasonable defences.

Movement from Donbas?

It is curious that Russia has not learned the lesson of two and a half years of war on foreign territory: Progress is not easy at this point. On no front. Having given all that advantage to Ukraine may now cost it dearly. If Gerasimov decides to divert troops and abandon the pressure on Kupiansk or Siversk, for example, that would already allow Syrskyi to move the men stationed there southwards to protect the Pokrovsk-Selidove-Vuhledar axiswhich is currently in grave danger.

That would be enough. It would not even be necessary for the Russians to withdraw from Chasiv Yar or Toretsk or Ukrainsk or Vodiane, to name some of the towns that have been partially or totally taken in recent days. It is understood that this will not happen, but if a minimal troop movement allows the rest of the Donbas front to breathe, it will necessarily be noticed in the defense of access to Pokrovskthe major communications hub in that area of ​​Donetsk.

Por supuesto, también hay que contemplar el escenario contrario: el “equipo B” del ejército ruso podría conseguir su objetivo y expulsar a las tropas ucranianas mientras los avances continúan en el frente oriental. En ese caso, sí, habría que decir que, más allá de lo simbólico, la incursión en territorio ruso no habría valido de mucho. La prensa estadounidense se cebaría con Syrskyi, desde la Casa Blanca se musitaría el enésimo “ya os lo dijimos” y el Kremlin obtendría una victoria moral evidente.

Estamos, por lo tanto, ante la hora de la verdad en lo que a Kursk se refiere y las próximas horas serán decisivas: habrá que evaluar hasta qué punto Putin quiere su victoria para el 1 de octubre o si puede modificar las fechas, algo a lo que se está acostumbrando en esta operación. Habrá que ver también si Ucrania es capaz de resistir con lo que tiene o si es obligada a recular. Pase lo que pase en territorio ruso, lo que realmente contará serán las consecuencias en Donetsk. Solo ahí se podrá juzgar el éxito o el fracaso de la decisión de Syrskyi.