The Kremlin is fed up with Wagner’s failures and is looking for mercenaries who do not compete with his Army

In that sense, Prigozhin’s immediate reaction by placing a Wagner Group flag next to the Russian flag on a pile of gravel that was once Bakhmut’s administrative building may have been the straw that broke the camel’s back. Sergei Shoigu, Valery Gerasimov and company. This is what the British Ministry of Defense thinks in its update on Tuesday. Putin would have already decided to put an end to Wagner’s adventure and would be looking for another private army that would be more docile to him.

The confrontation between Prigozhin and the Kremlin leadership is so public and notorious that it is impossible that it is not influencing the development of the war. De Prigozhin was the decision to go for Bakhmutnow nine months ago, and in Bakhmut tens of thousands of prisoners have been turned into cannon fodder and several of the best men of a paramilitary Army that was essential to reinforce the influence of Putin and Russia in Africa, with decisive interventions in Syria , Central African Republic, Libya, Mali or Mozambique.

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Prigozhin and Putin have always walked together and both have benefited from the relationship.no. It should not be forgotten that the former was the owner of the restaurant that the latter used to go to when he was mayor of St. Petersburg. Their relationship, therefore, goes back many years. Even in the Ukraine, it must be recognized that Wagner has risked his prestige and his life despite the continuous disregard from Moscow. Prigozhin went so far as to describe the high command’s refusal to send him more weapons as “possible treason”.

Something’s moving in the Crimea

On the other hand, it cannot be ignored that Wagner’s role in Bakhmut is being tremendous. The city is about to fall, yes, but nine months to conquer an enclave of 75,000 inhabitants is a long time. The lack of communication between Prigozhin and Gerasimov, together with the heroic Ukrainian resistance and the decision of their commanders to hold out in the square and not simply surrender it, have put to the ground what was announced as a second Russian offensive. After talking about it since last fall, in the end it seems to have been reduced to the conquest of Bakhmut, period. Attempts to break the front in Kreminna, Vuhledar, Avdiivka or Siversk they have ended in resounding failures.

Ukraine’s resistance has highlighted that Russia needs a Wagner Group if it is to win any serious conflict, but at the same time it has convinced the Kremlin that it needs a different Wagner Group, more docile, with less ego, that will renounce its own banners. and its propaganda and that it does not compete with the regular Army in recruiting combatants. In fact, although Russian legislation, ironically, prohibits the existence of paramilitary groups, one has already begun to operate in Ukraine itself, called Convoy and led by Sergei Axionov, head of occupied Crimea.

The existence of Convoy became official at the end of 2022although Axionov began his recruitment campaign at the beginning of the year, coinciding with the start of Putin’s “special military operation”. The military head of the organization is Konstantin Pikalov, Wagner’s ex-combatant in Madagascar, better known by his nom de guerre, ‘Mazai’, a man loyal to Axionov and, by extension, to Putin. Convoy has about 300 members who are divided between the Crimea itself and the Kherson front. Very little for what Russia needs at the moment.

Beyond Gazprom

For this very reason, for a long time, there has been speculation about the creation of a large Army in charge of a private company. The advantages are obvious: forced mobilizations that erode the popularity of the Government are avoided and one can skip all official conventions without anyone being able to blame the Kremlin for anything. After all, whoever executes without trial, who tortures, who rapes and robs civilians is not the regular Russian Armybut some paramilitaries that move, in theory, for their own interests.

Now, all of that costs money. At the time, there was talk of Gazprom as a possible sponsor of a huge militia loyal to Putin, but Gazprom has too many interests in the West to risk showing its face in that regard. In Russia, it is still believed that, once the war is over, everything will more or less continue as before, at least on the commercial level, and let us remember that there came a time when Gazprom had interests in almost every area of ​​European society, Champions League included. It is true that In February, the creation of security forces linked to the large Russian gas company was announced.but, in principle, their intentions are simply defensive: to avoid attacks on their infrastructures.

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The point is that Putin does not need to defend himself, but to attack: undertake a great offensive mobilization that shakes the Ukrainian hornet’s nest where his regular troops have been stuck for months. He could limit himself to strengthening existing ones, such as Roman Kadirov’s Chechen militias or the Patriot group, linked to Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, but the idea is to flee from great personalities at the head of the new Army. Putin wants someone with a low profile who will obey and not make antics for him in front of his related press. Neither Kadirov nor Shoigu give the profile. They like spotlights too much.

The other problem is purely demographic. There are not enough Russians for so many private armies. If the declared objective of the Ministry of Defense is to gather a contingent of one and a half million men just to fight in the Ukraine, if Wagner has his own means of recruiting and, in addition, each company seeks its Praetorian Guard, It is very difficult to find men prepared and willing to organize an elite Army. A new example of the chaos and disorganization that reign in the upper echelons of the Russian military.