Ten lessons from the return of History

Few will miss 2022, a year defined by a persistent pandemic, the advance of climate change, galloping inflation, slowing economic growth and, above all, the outbreak of a war in Europe and the concern that a conflict would soon break out. violent in asia Some of this could be foreseen, but much was not, and this highlights the danger of ignoring lessons from the past.

In the first place, the war between countries, considered obsolete by not a few academics, is the order of the day. What we are seeing in Europe is an old-fashioned imperial war, in which Russian President Vladimir Putin attempts to extinguish Ukraine as a sovereign and independent entity. His goal is to ensure that a market-based, democratic country seeking closer ties with the West cannot prosper on Russia’s borders and to set an example that might appeal to Russians.

Of course, instead of achieving the quick and easy victory he had hoped for, Putin has discovered that his own army is not as powerful and that his opponents are much more determined than he – and many in the West – had anticipated. Ten months later, the war continues with no end in sight.

Second, the idea that economic interdependence is a bulwark against war, because neither side would have an interest in disrupting mutually beneficial trade and investment ties, is no longer tenable. Political considerations come first. In fact, the European Union’s heavy dependence on Russian energy supplies probably influenced Putin’s decision to invade, leading him to conclude that Europe would not stand up to him.

Third, integration, which has fueled decades of Western China policy, has also failed. This strategy was also based on the belief that economic ties—along with cultural, academic, and other exchanges—would drive political evolution, rather than the other way around, leading to the emergence of a more open and business-oriented China. to the market, but also more moderate in its foreign policy.

None of this happened, although it can and should be debated whether the flaw lies in the integration concept or in the way it was executed. What is clear, however, is that China’s political system is becoming more repressive, its economy is moving in a more statist direction, and its foreign policy is increasingly assertive.

Fourth, economic sanctions, which in many cases are the instrument of choice for the West and its partners to respond to human rights violations or aggression abroad by a government, rarely produce significant changes in behavior. . Even aggression as flagrant and brutal as Russia’s against Ukraine has failed to persuade most of the world’s governments to isolate Russia diplomatically or economically, and while Western-led sanctions may be eroding Russia’s economic base, they have not come close to persuading Putin to reverse his policy.

Fifthly, the expression “international community” must be removed. Does not exist. Russia’s veto power in the Security Council has rendered the United Nations impotent, while the recent meeting of world leaders in Egypt to tackle climate change was an abject failure.

On the other hand, both the global response to Covid-19 and the preparations to face the next pandemic are scarce. Multilateralism remains essential, but its effectiveness will depend on forging closer agreements between like-minded governments. All-or-nothing multilateralism will lead nowhere in most cases.

“The expression ‘international community’ must be withdrawn. Does not exist. Russia’s veto power in the Security Council has rendered the UN powerless.”

Sixth, it is clear that democracies face their own challenges, but the problems facing authoritarian systems may be even greater. Ideology and regime survival often drive decision-making in these systems, and authoritarian leaders are often reluctant to abandon failed policies or admit mistakes, lest this be seen as a sign of weakness and fuel calls for change. These regimes must constantly reckon with the threat of mass protests, like in Russia, or of protests de factoas we have seen recently in China and Iran.

Seventh, the potential of the internet for individuals to challenge governments is much greater in democracies than in closed systems. Authoritarian regimes like those in China, Russia and North Korea can close access, monitor and censor content, or both.

Something more like a balkanization of the internet has arrived (splinternet) –multiple and separate internet–. Meanwhile, social networks in democracies are susceptible to spreading lies and misinformation that increase polarization and make governing much more difficult.

Eighth, there is still the West (a term based more on shared values ​​than geography), and alliances remain a fundamental instrument for promoting order. The United States and its NATO transatlantic partners have responded effectively to the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The US has also forged closer ties in the Indo-Pacific to counter the growing threat posed by China, mainly through an invigorated Quad (Australia, India, Japan and US), AUKUS (Australia, UK and US) and increased trilateral cooperation with Japan and South Korea.

Ninth, American leadership remains essential. The US cannot act unilaterally in the world if it wants to be influential, but the world will not come together to address shared security or other challenges if the US is passive or on the sidelines. The American willingness to lead from the front rather than the back is often required.

Finally, we must be reasonable about what we can know. It is humbling to see that few of the previous lessons were foreseeable a year ago. What we have learned is not only that history is back, but also that, for better or worse, it retains its ability to surprise us. With this in mind, let’s go for 2023!