The coming European order bears a profound resemblance to that of the past: peace will be the result of a military balance. Meanwhile, the potential greater European integration will not necessarily serve to turn the EU into an autonomous actor, but rather to turn it into a more effective instrument for organizing transatlantic relations.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has not only shattered what was left of the post-Cold War European order. It has also defined the new limits of the future order of Europe and, consequently, of the type of peace that said order will be able to sustain.
An armed peace, again
The war has no foreseeable end. It may lead to Ukraine successfully expelling Russian troops from its territory or to Russia consolidating its conquest of the entire Donbas and the area between it and Crimea. However, it could also turn into a frozen conflict, characterized by a prolonged military stalemate.
Whatever the outcome, Europe’s relations with Russia will remain deeply adversarial. The NATO-Russia border will be far more militarized than it is today, stretching seamlessly from Finland to the Black Sea, with a Western-armed Ukraine in between. The European Union’s approach to Russia will remain geared towards financial pressure and diplomatic isolation, while energy ties will be minimized or eliminated altogether. Relations between the United States and Russia will be confrontational, with perhaps minimal interaction to maintain the residual nuclear arms reduction treaty, the 2010 New Start (in force until 2026), but no dialogue on other measures.
“The European order of tomorrow – indeed, of today – bears a profound resemblance to the European order of the past. The peace of Europe is once again the result of a cold war»
In this highly antagonistic context, peace will not be the result of a collective effort at conflict management and resolution through institutions, rule-based regimes and accepted practices, as seemed possible for a time in the years after the dissolution of the bloc. Soviet. Instead, peace will be the default result of a military balance, once again underpinned by nuclear deterrence. The European order of tomorrow – indeed today – bears a profound resemblance to the European order of the past. The peace of Europe is again the result of a cold war.
One of the main consequences of the cold war-style curtain hanging over Europe is that the project of turning the EU into a more autonomous international actor will be more difficult to achieve. This is a consequence of the renewed existential relevance that the security guarantees offered by the US both through NATO and bilaterally have for most EU Member States.
In addition, the need for the EU to reconfigure its energy supply chains away from Russia will make EU countries more dependent on imports from the US itself, as well as from other energy-producing countries with strong ties to Washington, such as Saudi Arabia. Saudi, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and even Egypt and Israel.
More broadly, the war has widened pre-existing differences between US allies and rivals, including China. One effect of this binary logic will be that EU countries will have a greater incentive to side with Washington than before, as the costs of non-alignment will rise. Pursuing a different course of action towards countries like China or Iran – a prospect some EU member states have viewed favorably for years – is likely to produce fewer benefits and entail higher costs.
A change of power within the EU
The effect of increased binary competition between US allies and rivals will also be felt within the EU, where the war is causing a reconfiguration of the balance of power.
With the exception of Hungary, the Central and Eastern European EU Member States have united around the imperative of countering Russian aggression, which is also shared by a Nordic group aimed at developing a more homogeneous strategic perspective following the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. The northeast axis has also provided the post-Brexit UK with a way to reinsert itself on the European chessboard as a major player.
The change of power within the Union means that the EU’s foreign policy can hardly evolve in a direction that the northeast axis considers could endanger its relationship with the US. The US itself will be more willing to back the North-East-UK coalition, as this will, in most cases, give them greater influence in Europe than cater to the wishes of Germany or France.
This certainly does not mean that the EU will stop integrating. On the contrary, the competitive logic of the old-new European order is compatible with the advance of integration.
“Greater integration will not necessarily serve to make the EU an autonomous actor in foreign policy, but to make it a more effective instrument for organizing continental relations”
The war in Ukraine has reduced intra-community divisions on migration and energy. It has also created a demand for further rationalization of military spending and greater fiscal solidarity (probably through another attempt at selective debt mutualisation) to deal with the economic consequences of the war.
However, further integration will not necessarily serve to make the EU an autonomous actor in foreign policy, but rather to make it a more effective instrument for organizing continental relations. Military integration will not be enough to protect Europe, but it will be enough to increase European contributions to NATO. The selective mutualisation of debt will help to deal with the costs of the war, as well as to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine and the new rounds of enlargement, so that Europe can be more stable politically and economically, while still depending on guarantees US security.
A stronger Europe will not automatically be a more autonomous EU. In fact, a more integrated EU will be the result of Europe’s greater dependence on the US and greater antagonism on the board.
Three variables that can change the future
The scenario outlined above is realistic but it is not a given. There are a series of variables that can configure a different future.
The first is the internal evolution of Russia. There is no credible evidence that President Vladimir Putin’s power is in jeopardy or that his successor is willing or able to turn Russian foreign policy 180 degrees. However, wars have the capacity to reconfigure internal contexts to such an extent that what seems like an academic hypothesis one day can become a real possibility the next. It would be unwise to rule out the possibility that Russia’s foreign policy stance will change (and there is also the remote possibility that the Russian state might collapse as a result of a military defeat), although it would be unwise to design one’s policy accordingly. The end or relaxation of antagonism with Russia would again create the opportunity to establish a continental order based on rules and cooperation.
The evolution of the EU is the second variable. The Union may not generate the necessary resources to stabilize Ukraine and sustain further rounds of enlargement. Indeed, EU integration could come to a complete halt if the intra-community power shift sparks a backlash against the EU in Italy, France or even Germany. The decline in intracommunity solidarity would make it more difficult to maintain antagonism with Russia. It would also negatively affect the EU accession prospects of Ukraine, Moldova and the Balkan states, which would be more exposed to Russia’s policies of co-optation, intimidation and aggression. Consequently, the European order would become more volatile.
Finally, the scenario outlined above assumes that the US will remain as committed to Europe as it has been under Joe Biden. The old-new European order can only be sustainable on the condition of a friendly US administration. If Donald Trump, an outspoken skeptic of the transatlantic relationship and an outspoken critic of European integration, or someone with a similar foreign policy outlook were to become US president in 2025, the EU would again find itself at risk of fracture. The EU countries most dependent on US guarantees would be hard-pressed to contribute to a process of EU integration that Washington would view with suspicion. A less integrated EU could therefore be the price of America’s continued commitment to protecting Europe.
«The EU will continue to be dependent, possibly more than now, on the US, so the order of Europe will be facilitated by the structures of the EU, but guaranteed by the weapons of the United States»
Thirty years after the end of the Soviet Union, Putin’s war of conquest in the Ukraine has once again plunged Europe into a deeply antagonistic order, sustained by the military balance between NATO and Russia. While US security guarantees are vital for the territorial protection of the European states closest to Russia, EU countries are incentivized to become more integrated in order to deal with the economic consequences of the war, finance the reconstruction of Ukraine , sustain the enlargement process and manage the antagonism with Moscow. A stronger EU may indeed be one of the unintended consequences of the war. However, even if it is more integrated, the EU will continue to be dependent, possibly more than now, on the US, so the order of Europe will be facilitated by the structures of the EU, but guaranteed by the weapons of the United States, to a large extent. the same way as in the past.
This result is not a fact. Russia’s internal developments may end up leading to a less adversarial foreign policy stance. And what is more worrying, the EU may not generate the cohesion necessary to maintain antagonism with Russia and the US may lessen its commitment to Europe under future administrations. The Cold War order in Europe was notoriously adversarial but ultimately stable. Today, there is no guarantee that the European order will evolve in the same pattern.
Article originally published in English on the Instituto Affari Internazionali website.
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