How to get rid of vetoes in EU foreign and security policy?

Statement by the members of the panel of experts
EU “Group of Friends of Qualified Majority Voting”:

The world is changing and the European Union must equip itself with the means to respond adequately to major challenges. For decades, the EU has been criticised for its inaction, slow responses and cacophony of voices in managing global crises. At the same time, Member States’ positions on the EU’s role as a global actor have been converging. Recognising the EU as a “community of destiny” facing shared security threats has already prompted more cohesive EU action. The EU must fulfil its mandate to “promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world”. Its new geopolitical awareness requires it to increase its capacity to act.

However, at crucial moments, the requirement that all Member States agree on every foreign policy decision has undermined the Union’s ability to act as a unified force at a global level. Too often, crucial and urgent foreign policy decisions are blocked by one or two Member States, often for reasons unrelated to the issues at hand. This creates a system of negative incentives, where vetoing can be beneficial and exposes the Union to the influence of third parties seeking to divide it.

To avoid blocking behaviour and increase the EU’s capacity to better respond to global challenges, Member States should agree to move away from unanimity and to use Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) more frequently. Member States will only be able to accept this surrender of sovereignty if they are confident that effective mechanisms exist to protect their vital interests.

Twelve Member States (and two observers), united in the so-called “Group of Friends of the VMC” created in May 2023, have taken on this task. As part of a “Panel of Experts”, a group of academics advise on legal and political alternatives.

The EU Treaties already provide for mechanisms to facilitate decision-making. First, the European Council can unanimously decide to extend the list of matters that can be decided by CMV. Second, Member States can abstain from voting if they do not agree with a proposal, allowing the decision to be adopted despite their objections. Third, they can use the so-called “emergency brake” if a Member State must oppose a proposed decision for vital and declared reasons of national policy. In such cases, a qualified majority vote will not take place. Instead, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (currently Josep Borrell) will seek a solution. If this is unsuccessful, Member States can involve the European Council, where unanimity remains the norm.

However, further work is needed to reassure Member States that their national interests will not be ignored. Only by truly understanding the reasons behind objections can the High Representative and others find solutions that protect the Member State concerned, strengthen its resilience and address the EU’s overall responsibilities. This requires the objecting Member State to explain its reasons. A broader “safety net” is needed to make the move to CMV acceptable to those who fear losing influence in EU foreign policy.

How to achieve this? Without changing the Treaties, Member States could reach a political compromise on the transition to the VMC. Along with the extension of the VMC to the CFSP, Member States could agree on a procedure that allows for prolonging discussions on an issue (a mechanism similar to the Loánnina compromise). They could also note that the Council always seeks consensus, including with the VMC, a well-established practice to find solutions with the widest possible support. In addition, greater use of the underused constructive abstention should balance collective action with individual States’ concerns. Finally, Member States could work towards a political compromise to replace individual vetoes with a “collective veto”, which could require, for example, three Member States representing a certain percentage of the population.

In which areas should the VCM be used? It should apply at least to situations that affect the values ​​shared by all Member States by virtue of their membership of the Union. This means that statements on human rights, democracy and the rule of law would not be blocked. In response to international crises, the EU should act quickly. The VMC should therefore become the default voting method for the adoption of certain sanctions, the establishment of civilian crisis management missions and the adoption of cybersecurity measures.

By carefully considering these measures and paying particular attention to protecting vital national interests, the EU can better position itself to meet the immediate need to overcome the limitations of the veto. It could also enhance its long-term capacity to act globally, an objective that has enjoyed broad public support in recent decades.

Activity subsidized by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Global Affairs