From multi to plurilateralism

In the ministerial and other meetings of the G20, clashes between members who consider themselves part of the Global South, which is not a unit, and those of the G7 who, increasingly united, represent the Global West, are becoming more frequent. . Above all, but not only, as a result of the tensions between the US and its allies with China, and with Russia. Both are informal forums, whose value lies in being a place for meeting and coordination. Something that in the case of the G20 worked after the 2008 crisis while there was a coincidence of interests but that has declined. The G7, on the contrary, is being strengthened and has gained new vigor, not without hubris nor internal tensions – such as the scope of public aid to the industry in the US, compared to that in Europe. From it come common positions on issues of all kinds, including geopolitics, especially with sanctions, the preferred weapon of the West, of dubious effectiveness, as can be seen with Russia, since the world has changed.

The strengthening of the G7 is a symptom, or instrument, of a global West that refuses to stop ruling the world. This is when the United Nations Organization has lost importance. A Future Summit is being prepared at the UN for September. It sounds good, although the first proposals for the final declaration are quite empty of real content. He zero draft (zero draft) for the Pact for the Futurethe great project for international cooperation in the 21st century, made public in January, has disappointed due to its lack of ideas in the face of the enormity of the different challenges facing the world, and due to the lack of participation in its development by the Third Sector, of civil society and NGOs.

The confrontation, the irritation, of the South with the G7, with the North in general, has various reasons. The South sees a double moral standard from the West (for example, in the face of the Israeli counterattack in Gaza after the Hamas attacks of October 7), or in Russia’s war against Ukraine, among others. Sometimes he supports thatbut not him as. The sanctions, especially the freezing of assets of the Russian Federation – not to mention their possible use to help Ukraine, a policy that is making its way in the G7 – have been very poorly received by several countries in the Global South, due to the precedent what it can mean for some of its members, especially those who have more money.

On the other hand, a good part of this Global South, with the exception of the richest countries in hydrocarbons, cannot compete with public aid from the US and Europe to develop a cutting-edge industry, which will generate a new degree of dependence or of lack of development (which is why they have turned to China). The demands, especially European ones, to limit imports from countries that do not comply with an advanced green agenda – including the fight against deforestation for plantations, although the EU is slowing down its own – are also a cause of great irritation in the South. We will see the general impact of the decision of the G7 countries to stop using coal by 2035, while economies like China and India are still dependent on that resource and have increased their use, although they have also taken the lead in alternative energies. . Furthermore, the G7 is cutting its development aid and raising its interest rates, which is harming many economies in the South.

Although the G7 was born as an informal framework for economic and financial coordination between the then most developed economies in the world (USA, Canada, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Japan, in addition to the EU as such), since its beginnings in the 70 there was talk of geopolitics within it. Russia was invited in 1998, renamed the G8, and expelled in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea and occupation of part of Ukraine. From the G7, which now has think tanks, initiatives come out that are later reflected in organizations such as NATO or the EU, or in the member countries.

All members of the G7 – chaired this year by Italy – sit in the G20, currently headed by Brazil, and the only forum of this type in which Russia and China are also members. Part of the strengthening of the G7 has been a response to the rise of the BRICS (initially Brazil, Russia, India and China, plus, from 2010, South Africa), a forum invented in 2001 as an analysis tool by the British economist Jim O ‘Neill in a Goldman Sachs report. It has become a reality, and the BRICS are growing in members and instruments, along with organizations (such as the Shanghai Cooperation, or others promoted by China to question the institutions of the liberal order, those of Bretton Woods, which the US established after the Second World War but which has not known or wanted to adapt to the new realities of power in the world The G7 is the basis of a Western alliance, especially towards what is no longer called the “axis of evil” but an axis. anti-Western with China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, whose links in the polycrisis and polywar are very real.

The G20 falls into ineffectiveness, the BRICS are expanding and could soon add to the G7 in terms of GDP, not yet in wealth per inhabitant. Perhaps, as some propose, even expanding to countries like Australia or Spain. The latter was an objective that José María Aznar sought when he was at the head of the Spanish Government. Since 2008, when it began to participate in the summits, Spain has achieved the status of “permanent guest” in the G20, to which some from the South try to object time and again by considering that there is European overrepresentation within this cluster.

The G20 usually calls for a return to multilateralism. With a smaller mouth, also since the G7, following the rules established by the West. Although what we are experiencing with this proliferation of groups is the birth of plurilateralism, a term previously reserved for trade negotiations between a small group of actors, but which now means various regional or other groupings that compete with each other, but also have to set. In this world it means the existence of several multilateral orders, regional or not, that often compete with each other. It is more complex and less useful when it comes to solving, or at least managing global or even regional problems that are accumulating. We will see what the Future Summit delivers in September. This is not a merely institutional issue. Specifically, as it affects people’s lives, achieving the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 seems like a goal that is moving away rather than closer. But painting a more attractive future is free. Setting up or revamping a new world order based on shared rules is much more difficult.

Activity subsidized by the Ministry of Foreign and Global Affairs.